In defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality about color
Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Abstract
Are the following propositions true of the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time (Incompatibility); the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism); and most human observers usually perceive the colors of objects veridically in typical conditions (Veridicality)? One reason to think not is that the empirical literature appears to support the proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects amongst human observers in typical conditions (P-Disagreement). In this article, we defend Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality by calling into question whether the empirical literature really supports P-Disagreement. © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012.
First Page
547
Last Page
558
DOI
10.1007/s13164-012-0114-3
Publication Date
12-1-2012
Recommended Citation
Roberts, Pendaran and Schmidtke, Kelly, "In defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality about color" (2012). Liberal Arts Faculty Publications. 73.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0114-3
https://collections.uhsp.edu/liberal-arts_pubs/73